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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the providing of one-way paging service to the 
general public constitutes the service of a "public utility" 
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Utah Public Service 
Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal represents yet another chapter in the continuing 
dispute over whether providing one-way telephone paging services 
to the public constitutes a public utility subject to regulation 
by the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission"). Cases 
860313 and 860314 arising out of the Commission's actions follow-
ing remand in Williams v. Public Service Commissiony infraf were 
consolidated pursuant to an order of this Court and subsequently 
this action was also consolidated. All three cases present 
basically the same issue only in a slightly different procedural 
posture. This appeal stems from an Order and Declaratory Judg-
ment issued by the Honorable Timothy Hanson of the Third Judicial 
District Court in Williams v. American Paging, Inc., Case No. 
C86-1903 (See Appendix "A"), an action brought by Williams and 
Mobile Telephone, Inc. against American Paging seeking damages as 
a result of American Paging's providing paging services without 
authority. 
American Paging began offering one-way paging services in 
September, 1983 after being advised by the Commission in the 
controversial letter which formed the basis of the Court's 
decision in Williams v. Public Service Commission, infra, that 
the Commission deemed paging outside of its jurisdiction. The 
letter from the Commission unilaterally rejected 20 years of 
regulation by the Commission of paging services. This Court held 
that the action of the Commission in issuing the letter was an 
improper attempt at rule-making and remanded the case to the 
Commission. The Commission's failure to comply with this Court's 
order upon remand form the basis of the appeals in Case Nos. 
860313 and 830314. 
While the issues in this action are closely related to the 
issues presented in Cases 860313 and 860314, this case arises in 
the context of a claim for damages rather than in an administra-
tive or regulatory context. In that context, Judge Hanson issued 
an Order and Declaratory Judgment ruling that the providing of 
one-way paging services to the general public constitutes a 
public utility. (See Appendix A). It appears that the primary 
basis for Judge Hanson's decision was his interpretation of this 
Court's decision on Williams v. Public Service Commission, infra. 
Judge Hanson granted the parties' request for a final 
judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and this appeal was consolidated with the appeals taken from the 
Commission's action. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For over twenty years prior to 1983, the Utah Public Service 
Commission consistently construed and applied Utah Code Ann, 
S 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986), formerly Utah Code. Ann. 
S 54-2-1(21) and (22), to include one-way telephone paging 
services. The Utah Supreme Court has likewise held that the 
Commission, by its actions, has exercised jurisdiction over and 
regulated one-way paging services. Williams v. Public Service 
Commission. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
very service provided by Williams constitutes a "public utility" 
based on its interpretation of the term "telephone line" in the 
governing statutes. Thus, the consistent position adopted by the 
Commission and this Court (with no legislative pronouncement to 
the contrary) is that one-way telephone paging services fall 
within the definition of a "public utility". Notwithstanding 
several contrary interpretations from other jurisdictions, the 
interpretation consistently adopted in Utah has included paging 
services within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The long-standing administrative interpretation adopted by the 
Commission and recognized by this Court cannot simply be ignored 
and any attempt to deregulate the paging industry must satisfy 
statutory requirements. Since the paging industry has never been 
properly deregulated, American Paging's providing of one-way 
telephone paging services without authority properly subjects it 
to an action for damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-22. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ONE WAY PAGING CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC UTILITY 
AND ANY ENTITY PROVIDING PAGING SERVICES IN 
UTAH WITHOUT A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVE-
NIENCE AND NECESSITY IS SUBJECT TO AN ACTION 
FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 54-7-22 (1986). 
The issues presented by this appeal have been extensively 
briefed by all the parties in consolidated cases 860313 and 
860314. Williams, as petitioner in cases 860313 and 860314, has 
previously filed his opening brief, a reply brief, a reply brief 
to the Amici Curiae Brief, and now this brief. Rather than 
repeat in detail all of the arguments set forth in those briefs, 
Williams will highlight only those points particularly applicable 
to this appeal and direct the Court's attention to the other 
relevant arguments presented in the prior briefs. 
Simply stated, Williams takes the position that the Commis-
sion, by its actions in issuing and denying certificates of 
public convenience and necessity for paging services and other-
wise exercising regulatory jurisdiction over the paging industry, 
has adopted an interpretation of the relevant statutes so as to 
include paging services within its regulatory jurisdiction over 
public utilities. Williams further maintains that due to the 
long-standing nature of that consistent interpretation, the 
Commission cannot simply ignore its prior actions and declare the 
paging industry deregulated. This Court agreed with that posi-
tion as it was presented to the Court in Williams v. Public 
Service Commission. 720 P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1986); 
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The Commission also argues that because it 
had never formally determined that it had 
jurisdiction to regulate paging services 
under the Public Utilities Act, it was free 
to announce its opinion on the subject 
without any procedural formalities. There is 
no merit to the Commission's arguments. 
Judge Hanson apparently agreed with this Court's analysis and 
felt compelled to rule that paging services are a regulated 
public utility in Utah. 
American Paging, on the other hand, persists with the 
argument that the Commission and this Court have never determined 
whether paging services constitute a public utility. In support 
of that proposition they argue that the Commission's actions in 
regulating paging services were merely inadvertant acts of an 
administrative agency and that they should be ignored and deemed 
non-binding on the Commission. American Paging also sites 
several cases from other jurisdictions holding that paging 
services do not constitute public utilities under those states1 
statutes. American Paging also argues that if one were to 
include paging services within the regulatory scheme, services 
such as telephone answering machines, messengers, etc. would also 
fall within the definition of a public utility as "facilitating 
communication.'' In making such arguments, American Paging 
conveniently overlooks the fact that none of the services it is 
so fearful might be subject to regulation have ever been regu-
lated in the manner in which paging services have been. American 
Paging also ignores the historical significance attached by this 
Court to the Commission's regulation of paging services: 
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Understanding the history of the 
Commission's assertion of regulatory author-
ity over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way paging 
service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc. 
By this action, and without objection from 
any party, the Commission assumed jurisdic-
tion over both one-way paging and two-way 
mobile telephone services under sections 
54-2-1(21), (22), and (30) of the Code. 
Between 1962 and 1983 the Commission granted 
similar dual authority certificates to three 
other companies. In 1974, the Commission 
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, 
Inc., a single authority certificate covering 
only one-way paging service. From the 
record, it appears that the Commission has, 
on occasion, denied requests for certificates 
for one-way paging authority. 
720 P.2d at 774. 
American Paging repeatedly states that this Court has never 
determined whether the services provided by Williams constitute a 
"public utility". However, in Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons, 
Co., 602 P 2d. 684 (Utah 1979), this Court held that Williams was 
a "public utility" entitled to exercise the power of eminent 
domain in order to construct facilities for mobile radio and 
paging services. The Court reached that conclusion after examin-
ing the term "telephone line" as used in Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-34-1(8) (1953) and Utah Code Ann. S 54-2-1(21) (1953) (now 
Utah Code Ann. S 54-2-1 (30)). With respect to its interpreta-
tion of "telephone line" this Court stated: 
The term "telephone line" has a broad enough 
meaning to encompass a line of communication 
that would include radio-telephone communica-
tions. The term signifies a transmission 
system, whether it be composed of wires, 
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poles and supports, or transmitters, receiv-
ers, and antennas. 
The case sited by defendants, Minnesotta 
Microwave Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 
291 Minn. 241, 190 N.W. 2d 661 (1971) in fact 
sustains the ruling of the trial court as to 
plaintiff's power of eminent domain. Therein 
the court observed that mobile telephone 
systems and other activities designed to 
supplement or to work in conjunction with 
existing telephone services, clearly fell 
within what is comprehended as "telephone 
service." 602 P 2d. at 686-87. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P 2d. 773 
(Utah 1986), this Court once again recognized the long-standing 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Commission over paging services. 
Specifically, this Court stated: 
For over 20 years, the Commission has inter-
preted its authority over telephone corpora-
tions to include one-way paging services. It 
has required certificate holders to file 
tariffs and pay public utility sales taxes. 
It has denied some request for certificates. 
In one case, it issued a certificate that 
covered only one-way paging. In Medic-Call, 
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 
273, 470 P. 2d 258 (1975), the Commission 
even went to court to defend its jurisdiction 
over paging services. 
Under all these circumstances, we conclude 
that the Commission cannot reverse its long 
settled position regarding the scope of its 
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental 
policy change without following the require-
ments of the Utah Administrative Rule Making 
Act. (Citations omitted). These require-
ments were not met. 
720 P.2d at 776-77. 
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Based on the Court's conclusions in Williams, Judge Hanson 
ruled that paging services constitute a public utility and are 
subject to regulation: 
It is declared that the providing of one-way 
paging service to the general public consti-
tutes the service of a "public utility" which 
is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of 
the Utah Public Service Commission. 
Order and Declaratory Judgment, pp. 3f4. (over) 
Clearly, between the time that American Paging began offer-
ing paging services without authority in September, 1983, and the 
time this Court issued its decision in Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, on March 4, 1986, American Paging was operating 
unlawfully and without authority and is subject to an action for 
damages under Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-22 (1953) which provides: 
(1) In case any public utility shall do 
or cause or premit to be done any act, 
matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or 
declared to be unlawful, or shall omit 
to do any act, matter or thing required 
to be done, either by the Constitution 
or any law of this state or by any order 
or decision of the commission, such 
public utility shall be lieble to the 
persons affected thereby for all loss, 
damages or injury caused thereby or 
resulting therefrom, and if the court 
shall find that the act or omission was 
willful, the court shall, in addition to 
the actual damages, award exemplary 
damages. An action to recover for such 
loss, damage or injury may be brought in 
any court of competent jurisdiction by 
any person. 
The efforts of the Commission before and after Williams to 
deregulate paging services have all been deficient. Thus, the 
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continued providing of one-way paging service by American Paging 
since September 1983 has been unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order and Declaratory Judgment rendered by Judge Hanson 
declaring paging services a public utility is consistent with the 
interpretation adopted by the Commission and by this Court. As 
suchf the Order and Declaratory Judgment should be affirmed and 
the case remanded to the Third Judicial District Court for 
further proceedings on the issue of damages. 
Respectfully submitted this o "^ dav of January, 1987. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS d/b/a 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN PAGING, INC. OF 
UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN PAGING, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification, 
Certification, Stay cf Proceedi_ncs__s_n_d_ P r otective Ord^r 
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled 
Court on September 2, 1S-E6, and the following is acknowledged: 
SEP 10 1986 
of ' ' '' «. .' • n -
ORDER AXD 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-1903 
(Judge Hanson) 
A-l 
1. Keith E. Taylor appeared on behalf of plaintiff 
David R. Williams, Kay M. Lewis appeared on behalf of plain-
tiff Mobile Telephone, Inc., and Stuart L. Poelman appeared 
on behalf of defendant American raging, Inc. of Utah. 
2. The Court heard the respective arguments of counsel 
and has reviewed the pleadings and memoranda filed herein. 
3. Defendant American Paging, Inc. of Utah had pre-
viously filed its Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs had pre-
viously filed their Motions for Farticl Summary Judgment. 
Said motions were argued to the Court by both written memo-
randa and or«il argument presented on June 23, 19E6. On 
August 12, 1986, the Court entered its Order Denying Defen-
dant ' s Koticr, for Summarv Judonent and Grsntino Plaintiffs' 
• - * - -
Motions for Partial Sunmarv Judcmcrt and a Declaratcrv 
• i i • i i • • i i i . ,m i m i i in m 
Judgment. 
4. The parties have stipulated that the Court's Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment entered 
August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory Judgment entered in 
connection therewith should be vacated. 
5. Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. 
Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, the Court finds that 
the providing of one-way paging service to the general public 
in the State of Utah constitutes the services of a "public 
A-2 
utility," which is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the Utah Public Service Commission. 
6. The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment should 
be denied in all respects, except for the Declaratory Judg-
ment set forth herein. 
7. The Court finds that consideration of the questions 
raised concerning a stay of this action pending appeal and 
a protective order covering further discovery should be 
continued for determination at a later time*. 
8. The Court finds and the parties agree that this 
Order and Declaratory Judgment should be certified by the 
Court as a final judgment under the provisions of Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that a separate certi-
fication thereof should be entered. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment entered August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory 
Judament entered in connection therewith be and the s'ame are 
hereby vacated; 
2. It is declared that the providing of one-way paging 
service to the general public constitutes the service of a 
A-3 
"public utility" which is subject to the regulatory juris-
diction of the Utah Public Service Commission? 
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs* 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment are denied except as 
to the Declaratory Judgment set forth in the next proceecing 
paragraph. 
4. Consideration of a stay of this action pending 
appeal and of a protective order covering any further dis-
covery herein is continued; 
5. Defendant's request for certification under Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is granted and is con-
tained in the Court's Certification for/Appeal entered here-
with. 
DATED this /# day of Sept^ber. 19E6. 
BY COUP: 
' //jjf^—= 
yfimothy R. Hanson 
/ D i s t r i c t Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
684 Utah 602 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial 
Communications, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
HYRUM GIBBONS & SONS CO., a Utah 
Corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent, 
and 
North Utah Community T. V., a Utah 
Corporation, Intervenor and 
Respondent. 
No. 16024. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1979. 
Company engaged in the installation 
and operation of fixed base receiver and 
transmitter stations for mobile telephone 
and radio paging devices brought action to 
condemn land for the purpose of construct-
ing and operating a fixed base receiv-
er/transmitter station. The First District 
Court, Cache County, VeNoy Christoffer-
son, J., denied relief sought, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
J., held that: (1) the power of eminent 
domain was statutorily conferred upon 
plaintiff, and (2) plaintiff was entitled to 
condemn subject property, since it sustained 
its initial burden of proving that the partic-
ular taking was reasonably requisite to ef-
fect the authorized public purpose for which 
it was sought, and defendants presented no 
proof that plaintiff's exercise of discretion 
in selecting the property in question was a 
product of bad faith, fraud, caprice or arbi-
trariness; furthermore, issue of potential 
interference of plaintiff's proposed receiv-
er/transmitter station with intervener's ca-
ble television system was strictly a matter 
of federal law and was within jurisdiction 
of Federal Communications Commission. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
1. Eminent Domain *=>10(2) 
For purposes of statute providing that 
the right of eminent domain may be exer-
cised in behalf of "telegraph, telephone, 
electric light and electric power lines," the 
term "telephone line" has a broad enough 
meaning to encompass a line of communica-
tion that would include radio-telephone 
communications; therefore, the power of 
eminent domain was statutorily conferred 
upon company engaged in the business of 
installing and operating fixed base receiver 
and transmitter stations for mobile tele-
phone and radio paging devices. U.C.A. 
1953, 54-2-1(21), 78-34-1, 78-34-1(8). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Eminent Domain <*=»36 
Plaintiff's business of providing radio-
telephone services which interconnected 
with existing telephone system and which 
were available to members of the public 
constituted a "public service" for purposes 
of eminent domain statute. U.C.A.1953, 
54-2-1(21), 78-34-1, 78-34-1(8). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Eminent Domain $=56, 198(1) 
Where the legislature has conferred 
upon the court the duty of determining 
necessity of proposed taking, necessity must 
be established by evidence or the proceed-
ing fails; "necessity" does not signify im-
possibility of constructing the improvement 
for which power has been granted without 
taking the land in question, but merely 
requires that land be reasonably suitable 
and useful for the improvement. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Eminent Domain «=> 198(1) 
Company engaged in the business of 
installing and operating fixed base receiver 
and transmitter stations for mobile tele-
phone and radio paging devices was entitled 
to condemn subject property, since company 
sustained its initial burden of proving that 
particular taking was reasonably requisite 
to effect authorized public purpose for 
B - l 
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ClttaitUuh, 
which it was sought, and defendants 
presented no proof that plaintiff's exercise 
of discretion in selecting the property in 
question was a product of bad faith, fraud, 
caprice or arbitrariness; furthermore, issue 
of potential interference of company's pro-
posed receiver/transmitter station with in-
tervener's cable television system was 
strictly a matter of federal law and was 
within jurisdiction of Federal Communica-
tions Commission. U.OA.1953, 54-2-1(21), 
78-34-1, 78-34-1(8). 
David Lloyd and Walter P. Paber, Jr., of 
Watkins & Paber, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
B. H. Harris, Logan, for Hyrum Gibbons 
& Sons Co. 
L. Brent Hoggan, Logan, for North Utah 
Community T. V. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff initiated this action to condemn 
a one-tenth of an acre parcel of land for the 
purpose of constructing and operating a 
fixed base receiver/transmitter station for 
mobile telephone and radio paging devices 
in the Logan, Utah area. The trial court 
permitted North Utah Community T.V., a 
community television antenna company, 
CATV to intervene. Upon trial, the court 
ruled plaintiff had the power of eminent 
domain, but denied the relief sought in the 
complaint on the ground the taking of the 
particular site was not necessary to the 
public use of plaintiff where there were 
other satisfactory alternative sites in which 
plaintiff would not create any risk of inter-
ference with other public use facilities. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded to determine the 
damages to which the condemnee, Gibbons 
& Sons Co., is entitled. All statutory refer-
ences are to Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
Plaintiff is engaged in the business of 
installing and operating fixed based receiv-
er and transmitter stations through the 
Wasatch Front area for mobile telephone 
and radio paging devices. For this busi-
ness, plaintiff has a certificate of conve-
rt GIBBONS & SONS Utah 685 
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nience and necessity issued by the Public 
Service Commission and a first class radio 
telephone license issued by the Federal 
Communications Commission. The radio 
telephone channels and equipment opera-
tion are authorized and regulated by the 
F.C.C., while plaintiffs service is regulated 
by the P.S.C. In 1975, plaintiff was autho-
rized by the P.S.C. to furnish radio common 
carrier telephone service in the area of Lo-
gan, Utah, because of a public need there-
for. 
To institute service, it was necessary for 
plaintiff to locate a site for its fixed base 
station and antenna which must intercon-
nect with the Mountain Bell Telephone sys-
tem. The site was required to have both 
adequate elevation for coverage and close 
proximity to the service area for the autho-
rized low-wattage radio signals to penetrate 
major buildings and activate the paging 
devices. After extensive study and testing 
by plaintiff's engineers, plaintiff concluded 
there was only one site which met the cov-
erage and penetration requirements for ad-
equate service to the Logan area; this site 
is the subject matter of this action. The 
site is vacant property located on a knoll in 
the foothills in the southeastern section of 
Logan. 
Plaintiff and the condemnee could not 
agree on price, and this action was initiated. 
Community TV owns property adjacent to 
the site upon which it has located its CATV 
antenna which would be approximately 100 
feet from the base station. (This antenna 
is described as the head-end of the televi-
sion cable system operated by intervenor.) 
Community TV filed a motion to intervene 
which the court granted. In a memoran-
dum decision the trial court ruled it granted 
the motion, not on the ground of the prox-
imity of the movant's receiving station, but 
on the ground the movant had a valid inter-
est in the determination of whether this 
particular site was necessary for the public 
purposes of the plaintiff. 
At the hearing, plaintiff presented evi-
dence that the site was the sole one which 
would enable it to render an adequate ser-
vice on an economically feasible basis. 
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Plaintiff avers the location of the base sta-
tion in any other area would necessitate the 
installation of two additional transmitters 
at other locations, which would double or 
triple the cost of service. Plaintiff's wit-
nesses testified they did not know of an 
alternative site which would be economical-
ly feasible. Plaintiff Williams testified his 
company used quality equipment, and they 
had had no trouble with spurious harmonics 
or emissions. He expressed the opinion the 
equipment would not create interference, 
and any trouble with interference could be 
resolved with high pass filters. 
Defendant-Intervenor's experts testified 
there was an eight out of ten chance of 
interference from plaintiff's equipment 
with television sets within a one-half mile 
radius and an eight out of ten chance of 
interference with Channel 6 on the cable 
television line. The opinion was expressed 
that to avoid interference, plaintiff's equip-
ment should be located one or two miles 
from the head-end of the cable receiver. 
In rebuttal, plaintiff Williams testified 
the company had two sites close to televi-
sion receivers—Lewis Peak and Alta-Snow-
bird. At these locations, the television sig-
nal was of a very low grade, and the compa-
ny had received no complaints of interfer-
ence. He testified any interference prob-
lem can be solved by shielding. He ex-
pressed the opinion that the F.C.C. would 
not permit the company to interfere with 
4,000 television sets. 
The trial court found there were several 
other alternative sites which would perform 
the services offered by plaintiff. This par-
ticular site raised the likelihood that its 
installation would seriously interfere with 
the reception of several thousand television 
sets, including those sets in a proposed sub-
division within a distance of one-half mile. 
The trial court further found the intervenor 
owned and operated a cable television sys-
tem in Logan and adjacent communities. 
This cable system was operated under a 
certificate issued by the F.C.C. Intervenor 
provided cable service for approximately 
4,000 homes and had an investment in ex-
cess of $800,000. The trial court found that 
the service provided by intervenor was a 
public use. The trial court found the tak-
ing of this particular site was not necessary 
to the public use of plaintiff where there 
were other satisfactory sites which would 
meet the same conditions, and in which 
plaintiff would not run any risk of interfer-
ence with other public use facilities. 
[1] On appeal, plaintiff contends the tri-
al court erred in several particulars, and 
defendant cross-appeals contending the tri-
al court erred in its determination that the 
power of eminent domain had been con-
ferred on plaintiff under § 78-34-1(8). 
Section 78-34-1 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised in behalf of the following public 
uses: 
* * * * * * 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light 
and electric power lines, and sites for 
electric lights and power plants. 
Chapter 34, Title 78, does not define "tel-
ephone line." Such a term is defined in the 
code under the Chapter concerned with 
public utilities. Section 54-2-1(21) pro-
vides: 
The term "telephone line" includes all 
conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, in-
struments and appliances, and all other 
real estate and fixtures and personal 
property owned, controlled, operated or 
managed in connection with or to facili-
tate communication by telephone whether 
such communication is had with or with-
out the use of transmission wires. [Em-
phasis supplied.] 
Since the legislature has delegated its 
power of eminent domain to public utilities 
for certain uses, it is indeed appropriate to 
correlate the chapter on eminent domain 
with that concerned with public utilities. A 
consistent definition of "telephone line" in 
the two chapters is both logical and appro-
priate to accomplish the legislative objec-
tive of defining property devoted to a pub-
lic use. 
The term "telephone line" has a broad 
enough meaning to encompass a line of 
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communication that would include radio-tel-
ephone communications. The term signifies 
a transmission system, whether it be com-
posed of wires, poles and supports, or trans-
mitters, receivers, and antennas.1 The case 
cited by defendants, Minnesota Microwave 
. Inc. v. Public Service Commission? in fact 
sustains the ruling of the trial court as to 
plaintiffs power of eminent domain. 
Therein the court observed that mobile tele-
phone systems and other activities designed 
to supplement or to work in conjunction 
with existing telephone services, clearly fell 
within what is comprehended as "telephone 
service." 
[2] Defendants further urge that the 
taking herein was not for a "public use" to 
which the power of eminent domain is lim-
ited. First and foremost, the legislature 
has deemed a "telephone line" a public use 
in § 78-34-1(8). Secondly, a public use has 
been deemed as one which confers some 
benefit or advantage to the public. 
. . . Such public use is not con-
fined to actual use by the public, but is 
measured in terms of the right of the 
public to use the proposed facilities for 
which condemnation is sought. As long 
as the public has the right of use, wheth-
er exercised by one or many members of 
the public, a "public advantage" or "pub-
lic benefit" accrues sufficient to consti-
tute a public use. . .* 
Plaintiffs business of providing radio tel-
ephone services which interconnect with ex-
isting telephone systems, and which are 
available to the members of the public, con-
stitutes a public service.4 The obvious pub-
lic benefit or advantage from plaintiff's 
rendition of its public service is sufficient to 
constitute a public use. 
1. Brannan v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, 210 Tenn. 697, 362 S.W.2d 
236. 239 (1962). 
2. 291 Minn. 241, 190 N.W.2d 661, 666 (1971). 
3. Montana Power Company v. Bokma, 153 
Mont. 390, 457 P.2d 769, 772-773 (1969). 
4. National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners v. Federal Communications 
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Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in 
its interpretation and application of § 78-
84-4(2) and (3), whereunder the court deter-
mined the taking of this particular property 
was not necessary. 
Section 78-34-4 provides: 
Before property can be taken it must 
appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be 
applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such 
use; and, 
(3) If already appropriated to some 
public use, that the public use to which it 
is to be applied is a more necessary public 
use. 
Section 78-34-8(1) confers on the court 
the power to determine the conditions speci-
fied in § 78-34-4. 
In Salt Lake County v. Ramosellitl this 
Court stated that the power of eminent 
domain was not to be exercised thoughtless-
ly or arbitrarily, and the courts possess full 
authority to determine the proper limits of 
the power to prevent abuses in its exercise. 
[3] Where the legislature has conferred 
upon the court as in the case of § 78-34-
8(1), the duty of determining the necessity 
of a proposed taking, the necessity must be 
established by evidence or the proceeding 
fails. Necessity does not signify impossibil-
ity of constructing the improvement for 
which the power has been granted without 
taking the land in question; it merely re-
quires the land be reasonably suitable and 
useful for the improvement* 
The court in Montana Highway Commis-
sion v. Crossen-Nissen Co.,1 interpreted a 
. statute similar to § 78-34-4, and stated 
that the requirement that the condemnor 
Commission, C.A.D.C., 1976, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 
413, 417, 525 F.2d 630, 634. 
5. Utah, 567 P.2d 182, 183 (1977). 
6. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.) 
f 4.11 [4], pp. 4-202 to 4-203. 
7. 145 Mont. 251, 400 P.2d 283, 284 (1965). 
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must show necessity for the property taken 
did not mean that it must be indispensible 
to the proposed project. The word "neces-
sary" as used in the statute [93-9905, RCM 
1947] connoted that the particular property 
taken was reasonably requisite and proper 
for the accomplishment of the purpose for 
which it was sought under the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each case. 
Alaska has construed A.S. 09.55.270(2), 
viz., "the taking is necessary to the use," 
similar to Montana in City of Fairbanks v. 
Metro Company} The court explained: 
. . . once the condemnor has 
presented sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that a particular taking is "rea-
sonably requisite" for the effectuation of 
the authorized public purpose for which it 
is sought, particular questions as to the 
route, location, or amount of property to 
be taken are to be left to the sound 
discretion of the condemning authority 
absent a showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that such determinations are the 
product of fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness. 
The court's analysis of the evidence clear-
ly reveals the application of the foregoing 
standard. The court observed the City had 
clearly met its initial burden of demonstrat-
ing its taking was reasonably necessary un-
der the circumstances. The court contin-
ued: 
Moreover, the evidence 
presented to the effect that the City's 
location of the sewer line on one side of 
the street as opposed to the other might 
entail higher acquisition and construction 
costs, and that a larger number of people 
were located on the other side by virtue 
of recent land development in the area, 
does not qualify as clear and convincing 
evidence that the City's determination 
was arbitrary or amounted to an abuse of 
discretion. 
8. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1975). 
9. 23 Utah 474, 484. 65 P. 735, 739 (1901). 
10. Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, Note 5 su-
pra, is in accord with Postal Tel.Cable; therein 
The foregoing precepts were expressed in 
Postal Tel Cable Company of Utah v. Ore-
gon S.L.R. Company: • 
. . It is not a question whether 
there is other land to be had that is 
equally available, but the question is 
whether the land sought is needed for the 
construction of the public work. The ne-
cessity is shown to exist when it appears 
that it is necessary to take the land by 
condemnation proceedings in order to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the corporation. 
[Citation.] The respondent has the right 
to determine when and where its tele-
graph line shall be built. It may be said 
to be a general rule that, unless a corpo-
ration exercising the power of eminent 
domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of 
oppression, its discretion in the selection 
of land will not be interfered with. . . , 0 
[4] A review of the record in the instant 
case clearly establishes plaintiff sustained 
its initial burden of proof, viz., this particu-
lar taking was reasonably requisite to ef-
fect the authorized public purpose for which 
it was sought. The defendants presented 
no proof and the trial court made no find-
ing that plaintiff's exercise of discretion in 
selecting this particular property was a 
product of bad faith, fraud, caprice, or arbi-
trariness. Plaintiff was entitled to con-
demn the property. Furthermore, since the 
property plaintiff sought to condemn was 
not already appropriated to a public use, 
subdivision 3 of § 78-34-4 was not applica-
ble. 
The issue of the potential interference of 
plaintiff's station with intervenor's cable 
system is strictly a matter of federal law 
and is within the jurisdiction of the F.C.C. 
. . Unquestionably, federal leg-
islation has pre-empted local regulation 
of radio transmission, including assign-
ment of frequencies, interference phe-
this Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that 
the attempted condemnation was clear abuse 
of discretion. 
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nomena, and the content of broadcast 
material. [Citations] . . . u 
A review of the complex detailed regula-
tions governing the authorizations for base 
stations [see 47 C.F.R. (1978), Subpart G— 
Domestic Public Land Mobile Radio Service, 
§ 21.500 et seq.] clearly illustrates federal 
regulations have pre-empted control in this 
area." Under 47 C.F.R., § 21.500, autho-
rization for construction of plaintiffs base 
station is contingent on whether the public 
interest, convenience or necessity would be 
served by a grant of plaintiff's application. 
Intervenor will have an opportunity to set 
forth the interference issue before the 
F.C.C. If the F.C.C. undertakes to license 
one type of communication service and it 
appears likely the new service will degrade 
or impair the quality of existing service 
regulated by the F.C.C, the Commission is 
required under the public interest standard 
to balance the gains and losses to the public 
that will result from the changed conditions 
in both services.11 
Having determined this matter by resolu-
tion of the fundamental issue, we do not 
reach other assigned error. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, and 
HALL, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL Utah 689 
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CELEBRITY CLUB, INC., a Utah 
Nonprofit Corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, Defendant 
No. 16083. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 22, 1979. 
Liquor license applicant filed petition 
seeking relief from order of the Liquor 
Control Commission denying application for 
license. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., 
held that where Commission represented to 
applicant that applicant's plot plan complied 
with statute prohibiting the issuance of 
such licenses to clubs located within a radi-
us of 600 feet of any public or private 
school, and applicant, in reliance upon such 
representation, expended upwards of $200,-
000 to complete its club, Commission was 
thereafter estopped to deny the license on 
ground that applicant's facilities did not 
comply with the 600-foot requirement. 
Order accordingly. 
Crockett, C. J., and Wilkins, J., con-
curred specially and filed opinions. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
1. Estoppel «=»52.15 
Elements essential to invoke doctrine 
of equitable estoppel are: an admission, 
statement, or act inconsistent with claim 
afterwards asserted; action by other party 
on faith of such admission, statement, or 
act; and injury to such other party result-
ing from allowing the first party to contra-
dict or repudiate such admission, statement, 
or act. 
11. Schroeder v. Municipal Court of Los Cerri-
tos, 73 Cal.App.3d 841, Ml Cal.Rptr. 85, 87 
(1977). 
12. See Fields v. Davis, 31 Or.App. 607, 571 P.2d 
511, 516 (1977) for the type of state regulation 
of mobile common carriers that has not been 
pre-empted by federal legislation. 
13. H. ic B. Communications Corporation v. 
Federal Communications Commission, C.A. 
D.C.. 1969, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 413, 420 F.2d 638. 
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David R, WILLIAMS, dba Industrial 
Communications, Petitioner, 
• . 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man; David R, Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, Petitioner, 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man, David R. Irrine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
Nos. 19867, 19873. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 4, 1986. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Public Service Commission holding that 
Commission had no authority to regulate 
one-way mobile telephone paging services. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act so that Commis-
sion was required to follow Act's procedur-
al requirements. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Telecommunications *=»461 
Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act [U.CJL1953, 63-
46-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission 
was required to follow Act's procedural 
Utah 773 
requirements. U.C.A.1953, 64-1-1 et seq., 
54-1-1.6, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et 
seq., 63-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3)(a), 63-*6a-4; 
U.OA.1953, 63-46-1, 63-16-3(4), 63-46-5 
(Repealed); Const Art 1, § 7; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Telecommunication! *=»461 
Commissioners on Public Service Com-
mission who had participated. in decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
was required to operate one-way mobile 
telephone paging service, announced in let-
ter to prospective operator, would not be 
precluded from considering the jurisdiction-
al matter on remand on basis that they had 
violated statutory prohibitions against ex 
parte communications, where prospective 
operator was not party to any proceeding 
pending before Commission at time letter 
was issued. U.C.A.1953, 54-7-1.5. 
Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Mi-
chael L Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
David L Stott, Stuart L Poelman, Salt 
Lake City, for intervenor Amer. Paging. 
Stephen R. Handle, Salt Lake City, for 
Page Amer. 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig 
Rich, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Petitioners Industrial Communications 
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an 
order of the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion ("Commission'9) holding that the Com-
mission has no authority to regulate, one-
way mobile telephone paging services. Pe-
titioners allege, inter alia, that the Com-
mission did not follow proper administra-
tive procedures in concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commis-
sion failed to adhere to proper require-
ments in ruling on the jurisdictional issue, 
and accordingly reverse and remand for a 
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new hearing that comports with the appli-
cable statutes. 
Understanding the history of the Com-
mission's assertion of regulatory authority 
over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate, both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way 
paging service to petitioner Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc. By this action, and without 
objection from any party, the Commission 
assumed jurisdiction over both one-way 
paging and two-way mobile telephone ser-
vices under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and 
(SO) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983 
the Commission granted similar dual au-
thority certificates to three other compa-
nies. In 1974, the Commission granted to 
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a 
single authority certificate covering only 
one-way paging service. Prom the record, 
it appears that the Commission has, on 
occasion, denied requests for certificates 
for one-way paging authority. Until 1983, 
however, the Commission's authority to 
regulate one-way paging services was not 
questioned. 
In the early 1980's, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission deregulated radio 
frequencies for use in paging services. 
Sixty-nine channels were made available in 
1. U.CJL, 1953. | 54-2-1(30) (Rcpt. Vol 6A. 
1974), states in part: "The term 'public utility' 
includes every . . . telephone corporation . . . 
where the service is performed for, or the com-
modify delivered to the public generally...." 
Subsection (22) states: 
The term "telephone corporation" includes ev-
ery corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed 
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, 
operating or managing any telephone line for 
public service within this state. 
Subsection (21) sutes: 
The term "telephone line" includes all con-
duits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments 
and appliances, and all other real estate and 
fixtures and personal property owned, con-
trolled, operated or managed in connection 
with or to facilitate communication by tele-
phone whether such communication is had 
with or without the use of transmission wires. 
2. See 47 C.F.R. 22301(aXD and (4), (d) and 
(pXD (19S3). 
Utah on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc., 
and United Paging Corporation each re-
ceived a permit from the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to operate on one of 
the new frequencies early in 1983.* IQ 
May of 1983, American Paging*s attorney 
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire 
whether American Paging could operate a 
one-way paging system without a certifi-
cate. At the request of this attorney, Com-
missioner JUvine discussed the issue with 
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the 
Commission sent a letter to the attornej 
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983, 
stating that in the Commission's opinion, nc 
certificate was required. It added that the 
Commission would not request a hearing 
on the issue.1 That letter is the basis ol 
the controversy here. 
In August of 1983, Page America applied 
for a certificate to operate a paging aer 
vice; petitioner Industrial Communications 
protested the application. The Commissioz 
scheduled a public hearing on the applica 
tion for December of 1983, indicating iU 
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over one 
way paging services. Page America latei 
moved for a determination that it was ex 
empt from regulation. The Commissioi 
scheduled a hearing on that motion foi 
November 7th. 
S. After receiving its permit from the FCC, Unit 
ed Paging Corporation applied to the Commii 
sion for a certificate of convenience and neees 
airy, which application was pending at the tim< 
of the Commission's hearing now under review 
United Paging did not take pan in that hearing 
and its present status is not apparent from thi 
record. 
4. The letter read in pertinent part-
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is pre 
posing to offer only one-way paging service 
rather than telephone service as defined in th< 
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary fo 
your client to file an application for a certifi 
cate of public convenience and necessity. A 
a matter of policy the Commission does no 
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basil 
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on it 
fact that it would not. on its own motion 
require a hearing with respect to your pre 
~~scd operation., 
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun 
operations without a certificate in reliance 
on the Commission's June letter declining 
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Commu-
nications therefore asked the Commission 
to issue a cease and desist order to stop 
American Paging from operating without a 
certificate. A hearing on the cease and 
desist request was held October 24, 1983. 
At that hearing, the Commission admitted 
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had 
•'contradicted itself somewhat by the is-
suance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter/' The 
Commission refused to order American 
Paging to stop operations; however, it or-
dered American Paging not to accept new 
customers until after the November hear-
ing on Page America's certificate at which 
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed. 
Following the November hearing, the 
Commission formally ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices, effectively deregulating that field. 
The Commission dismissed Page America's 
application for a certificate and cancelled 
the certificates of Industrial Communica-
tions and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the 
extent they authorized one-way paging ser-
vices. It also cancelled the certificate 
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern 
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a 
one-way paging system.1 
After the ruling, Industrial Communica-
tions, which had opposed deregulation, 
tought a reversal of the Commission's or-
der and a disclosure of ex parte communi-
cations relating to the jurisdictional issue. 
It abo moved for a rehearing before a 
commission pro tempore, claiming that by 
virtue of the June letter to American Pag-
ing, the Commission had prejudged the jur-
S. Two companies not participating in the hear-
ing still hold certificates of convenience and 
necessity for one-way paging services. 
& Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983 
(1983 Utah Laws ch. 246. § 5). provides for a 
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by 
the governor when a commissioner is "tempo-
rarily dismissed or disqualified." Commission-
ers pro urn shall have the qualifications re-
quired for public service commissioners. 
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and 
replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise 
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tsdictional issues.1 The Commission ac-
knowledged the June letter and the eon-
tacts leading up to it, but refused to set 
aside its order for any reason. On appeal, 
Industrial Communications and Mobile 
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commis-
sion's actions. 
The principal procedural point raised by 
petitioners is that the Commission's June 
letter effectively operated to relinquish the 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way 
paging, and stripped petitioners and their 
similarly situated competitors of a valuable 
property right—their certificates. Petition-
ers argue that under the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the 
hearing provisions of the Public Service 
Commission Act, and the due process claus-
es of state and federal constitutions, the 
June letter constituted a de facto rule mak-
ing which required that all interested par-
ties be given proper notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. See U.C.A., 1953, § 63-
4&-5 (2nd Repl. Vol. 7At 1978); U.C.A., 
1953, § 54-7-13 (Repl. VoL 6A, 1974); Utah 
Const art I, § 7; and U.S. Const amend. 
XIV. 
HI We first inquire whether the Com-
mission's actions complied with the proce-
dural requirements of the statutes govern-
ing agency rule making or agency adjudica-
tion. Any state agency promulgating a 
rule must follow the procedures specified 
in that act U.C.A., 1953, f 6&-46-I (2nd 
Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978).7 A rule is defined as 
a "statement of general applicability . . . 
that implements or interprets the law or 
prescribes the policy of the agency in the 
administration of its functions...." 
U.CJL, 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd Repl. VoL 
to this action occurred. Our conclusion would 
not be any different were we to analyze this 
case under the new statute. 1985 Uuh Laws ch. 
158, f 2. The statute now requires rule making 
whenever "agency actions affect a class of per-
sons" and defines a rule as "a statement made 
by an agency that applies to a general class of 
persons . . . [which] implements or interprets 
policy made by statute...." U.CJL. 1953. 
i 6a-46a-3(3Xa). -2(8) (2nd RrpL VoL *A. 1978 
and Supp.2985). 
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7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also 
relied on by petitioners, requires that the 
Commission give notice and hold a hearing 
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an 
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13 
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim 
that the procedural requirements of at 
least one of these statutes apply here be-
cause the June letter constituted either a 
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Mak-
ing Act, or an "order" within the meaning 
of the Public Utilities Act 
The Commission argues that the June, 
1983, letter was not a rule making within 
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act 
because it did not have general applicabili-
ty. The Commission also argues that be* 
cause it had never formally determined 
that it Ytad jurisdiction to regulate paging 
services under the Public Utilities Act, it 
was free to announce its opinion on the 
subject without any procedural formalities. 
There is no merit to the Commission's ar-
guments. 
As an initial tnatter, we note that the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
seems most directly on point here. It deals 
in some specificity with matters that the 
Public Utilities Act covers only inferential-
ly, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do 
not appear inconsistent with the earlier en-
acted utility statute. 
The pivotal question is whether the deci-
sion announced by the Commission in the 
June letter amounted to a rule. It might 
be argued that the Commission's action 
here is merely legitimate law development 
through adjudication as opposed to rule 
taaki&g. We tckxvowledge. that there is % 
variance of opinion on when an agency is 
engaged in rule making and must follow 
formal rule making procedures, and when 
an agency may legitimately proceed by 
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., S94 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct 
1426, 22 LEd.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 VS. 267, 94 S.Ct 
1757, 40 L£d.2d 134 (1974). However, we 
think 'that there are some fundamental 
a. For these reasons, section 54-7-1 J. governing 
the functions of the Commission when entering 
points of reference in this area of the law 
that are of assistance in determining 
whether the Commission should have pro-
ceeded by formal rule making. Professor 
Davis summarized some of these considera-
tions. 
Although a retroactive clarification of 
uncertain law may be brought about 
through adjudication, according to [SEC 
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct 
1575, 91 LEd. 1995 (1F47) ] and its many 
progency . . . , the problem may be differ-
ent when an agency through adjudication 
makes a change in clear law, as when it 
overrules a batch of its own decisions, 
especially if private parties have acted in 
reliance on the overruled decisions. 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
\ 7:25, at 122 {2d ed. 1978). Interpreting 
the definition of "rule" contained in section 
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Commis-
sion was engaged in rule making and had 
to follow the requirements of the Utah 
.Administrative Rule Making Act1 
First, the Commission's decision was 
generally applicable: by deregulating the 
one-way paging market and permitting 
open competition in the market, the deci-
sion altered the rights of all certificate 
holders, despite their explicit reliance on 
the Commission's prior interpretation. Sec-
ond, the letter interpreted the scope of the 
Commission's statutory regulatory powers, 
thus "interpreting] the law," within the 
meaning of the Rule Making Act More-
over, in so acting the Commission, in the 
words of Professor Davis, made a "change 
b clear law." For over twenty years, the 
Commission has interpreted its authority 
over telephone corporations to include one-
way paging services. It has required cer-
tificate holders to file tariffs and pay public 
utility sales taxes. It has denied some 
requests for certificates. In one case, it 
issued a certificate that covered only one-
way paging. In Medic-Call Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 
P.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went 
an order, has no application to the June letter 
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance. 
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to court to defend its jurisdiction over pag-
ing services.1 
Under all these circumstances, we con-
clude that the Commission cannot reverse 
its long-settled position regarding the scope 
of its jurisdiction and announce a funda-
mental policy change without following the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor 
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981), 
cert denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct 358, 74 
LEd.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at 
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were 
cot met. Nonparties were not given notice 
of the Commission's intention to reconsider 
its long-held position in connection with the 
June letter. And the November adjudica-
tive hearing certainly cannot be considered 
an adequate substitute for a rule making 
proceeding. Many of the protections pro-
vided for by the Act were missing from 
that proceeding, including adequate ad-
vance notices to all affected parties, an 
opportunity to participate, and an opportu-
nity to comment on the proposed rule. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A, 
1978, Supp.1985). Because the require-
ments of the Act were not satisfied, the 
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
12] The next issue is whether the cur-
rent commissioners should be precluded 
from considering the jurisdictional matter 
on remand. Petitioners contend that the 
commissioners who participated in the deci-
sion announced in the June letter had pre-. 
judged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, 
they request that we order the recusal of 
all the commissioners and the appointment 
of a commission pro tempore. 
Petitioners assert that recusal is neces-
aary because the opinion announced in the 
June letter violated the statutory prohibi-
tions against ex parte communication 
about matters pending before the Commis-
sion. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part: 
9. This Court ruled in Medic-Call that the PSC 
could have no jurisdiction over a private non-
profit paging service because it was not a public 
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a 
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No member of the public service commis-
.sion . . . shall make or knowingly cause 
to be made to any party any communica-
tion relevant to the merits of any matter 
under adjudication unless notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are afforded to 
all parties. No party shall make or 
knowingly cause to be made to any mem-
ber of the commission . . . an ex parte 
communication relevant to the merits of 
any matter under adjudication. 
There are several problems with petition-
ers' argument By its terms the statute 
does not apply to dealings between the 
Commission and American Paging. In 
May and June of 1983, American Paging 
was not a party to any proceeding pending 
before the Commission that involved the 
question of the Commission's jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. Moreover, 
the letter was not an adjudication but, in 
substance, a rule making, as we have noted 
above. Therefore, any dealings between 
American Paging and the commissioners 
could not be a communication between a 
"party" and a member of the Commission 
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter 
under adjudication." Second, section 54-7-
1.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983, 
almost a month after the letter was writ-
ten. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15. 
It is true that the later proceedings be-
fore the Commission on the application of 
Page America for a certificate should be 
classified as an "adjudication" within the 
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these 
proceedings occurred after the effective 
date of the statute. However, that does 
not change the .nature of the May and June 
communications between the Commission 
and American Paging nor the fact that the 
atatute, by its terms, does not apply to 
them. 
Because the jurisdictional issue likely 
will be resolved by a rule making proceed-
ing on remand and will obviate the need for 
further proceedings, we need not further 
publicly available paging service, such as peti-
tioners here operate, would be a public utility 
because our holding was limited to the pnvate 
nature of the arrangements before us. 
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eonsider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
( o iiivitiMi<MriTt»> 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court held that (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle whOe under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles e»144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles «=» 144.2(10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.CJL1953,41-6-14.10. 
J. Automobiles «»144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles *»144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content U.OA.1953,41-6-44.10(1,2). 
5. Automobiles *=»349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
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APPENDIX D 
Utah Code Ann., § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986). 
Public Utilities Definitions: 
When used in this title: 
* * * * 
(30) "Telephone corporation" includes every 
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, 
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, 
or managing any telephone line for public ser-
vice within this state, provided, however, that 
all corporations, partnerships, or firms pro-
viding intrastate cellular telephone service 
shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine 
months after both the wire-line and the nonwire-
line cellular service providers have been issued 
covering licenses by the Federal Communications 
Commission. It does not include any person 
which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone 
or telecommunication service which is purchased 
from a telephone corporation. 
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, 
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and 
applicances, and all other real estate, fixtures, 
and personal property owned, controlled, oper-
ated, or managed in connection with or to facili-
tate communication by telephone whether that com-
munication is had with or without the use of 
transmission wires. 
